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1. INTRODUCrION
As the global nature of the economy intensifies, countries must
establish a worldwide presence to avoid desperate economic cir-
cumstances and compromised sovereignty. To remain viable, na-
tions must carefully balance free trade objectives with other vital
goals, such as preserving culture. However, when an economic
superpower, like the United States, has co-opted the prevailing in-
ternational trade dispute system to perpetuate its own economic
and cultural advantages, other countries find it very difficult to
promote their own interests. These countries should not respond
to this difficulty by adopting strategies that are inconsistent with
the efficiency rationale that underlies all of international trade. In-
stead of attacking international multilateral trade arrangements,
countries should protect and promote their economic interests and
culture within smaller bilateral and regional trade agreements.
Ultimately, as they gain market power and build relationships
with other members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade' ("GATT"), countries can redirect international trade dia-
logue to recognize and support cultural preservation even at the
cost of reducing the completely unfettered nature of free trade.
Section 2 of this Comment considers rationales for preserving
culture and the difficulties of preserving it when countries' do-
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1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]; see also General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter GATT 1994], Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter the WTO Agreement], Annex
1A, in GATr SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 20 (1994) (incorporating the GATT 1947 into the WVTO
Agreement).
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mestic industries are unable to compete with foreign import prod-
ucts. Section 3 discusses the difficulties of obtaining and the dis-
advantages of maintaining expansive, protectionist international
trade strategies, and suggests bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments as an alternative. Section 4 illustrates the advantages of less
protectionist regionalism with a case study of Japan and South Ko-
reas recent joint efforts to promote their economies. This Com-
ment concludes that countries that hope to successfully promote
their cultural industries within international trade arrangements
such as the GATT should emulate Japan and South Korea's exam-
ple.
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING CULTURE
Completely unfettered free trade is not the only efficient real-
ity, even from an economic perspective.2 The ultimate efficiency of
entirely free trade is lessened when one takes into account the
unique nature of cultural products that may be incommensurable 3
The cultural products may be desired even when producing them
is economically inefficient.4 Further, foreign cultural products that
enter a country through open trade may erode the cultural values
and identities of those who receive them.5
Erosion of cultural values and identities is dangerous. There
are many advantages to preserving a country's culture as well as
its ability to profitably market its cultural products. Preserving a
2 See Richard A. Westin, When One-Eyed Accountants Are Kings: A Primer on
Microeconomics, Income Taxes and the Shibboleth of Efficiency, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1099,
1106 (1985); Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72
IOWA L. REv. 577,603 n.103, 604,607 n.108 (1987).
3 For example, the doctrine of moral rights says that cultural products are not
just like any other fungible product because the creator has essential, non-
economic rights to control how the product is altered or used in the future. See
generally Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 2 (1994); Jeffrey M. Dine, Note, Authors' Moral Rights in Non-European Na-
tions: International Agreements, Economics, Mannu Bhandari, and the Dead Sea Scrolls,
16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 545, 550 (1995); Jonathan Stuart Pink, Note, Moral Rights: A
Copyright Conflict Between the United States and Canada, 1 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 171,
186 (1994).
4 See Michael Braun & Leigh Parker, Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or
Cherished Articulation of a Nation's Soul?, 22 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoI'Y 155, 170, 174
(1993).
5 See Emile G. McAnany & Kenton T. Wilkinson, Introduction to MAss MEDIA
AND FREE TRADE: NAFTA AND THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 3,4 (Emile G. McAnany &
Kenton T. Wilkinson eds., 1996).
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country's culture promotes its sovereign equality and protects hu-
man rights by enabling its people to celebrate and maintain their
culture.6 As an important tool of democracy, culture is needed for
identity7 cohesion, and the ability to express oneself.8 Similarly,
cultural products are "vehicles of meaning and values" and are
thus integral to democracy.9 These products influence citizens by
shaping behavior, personality, attitudes, and approaches to the
world, and sometimes affect social change10 Cultural industries
are needed to preserve culture," traditions, and language.U
As a result, cultural products are public goods whose protec-
tion merits government intervention.13 At least twenty-one coun-
tries have signed treaties expressing their belief that it is sometimes
appropriate to treat cultural trade and investments differently than
other trade products. The exceptions to the GATr and other trade
agreements evidence these countries' reluctance to lose control of
the viability of their cultural industries.14
6 See Chi Carmody, When "Cultural Identity Was Not at Issue": Thinking About
Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
231, 242-43 (1999) (citing ATHANASIA SPIuOPOULOU AjcRMAR, JusTIIcATIO.N¢S OF
MiNoRnY PROTECTION IN INTRNATIONAL LAw 78-83 (1997) and O!P'ENimi's
INTERNATIONAL LAw 87, 88 n.5 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992)); cf. TRANSFRONTIER TELEVISION IN EUROFE: THE HUMtAN RIGHTS DmtDEsiOr
206 (Antonio Cassese & Andrew Clapham eds., 1990) (noting that full access to
information and opinion for everyone may necessitate restricting those who
dominate the information market).
7 See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: Thze Constitution and Cultural Iden-
tity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 307, 309 (1986); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Trans-
lating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 39 Dult LJ.
625, 658 (1990).
8 See Dennis Browne, Introduction to THE CULTURE/TRADE QUANDARY:
CANADA'S POUCY OPTIONS 1, 5 (Dennis Browne ed., 1993).
9 Marc Raboy et al., Cultural Development and the Open Economy: A Democratic
Issue and a Challenge to Public Policy, 19 CAN. J. CoMM. 291-315 (1994); see Clint N.
Smith, Note, International Trade in Television Programming and GAT: An Analysis of
Why the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 97,133 (1993).
10 See CONRAD PHILuP KOTTAK, PRIME-TIME SOcIEIY: AN ANTHROFOLOGI-CAL
ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION AND CULTURE 10-12 (1990).
11 See McAnany & Wilkinson, supra note 5 (describing how cultural industries
in Quebec have preserved the francophone population's culture).
12 See Suzanne Perry, Pinheiro Says U.S. Film Exports Will Grow Despite Limits,
REUTER E.C. REP., Sept. 23,1993.
13 See Daniel Schwanen, A Matter of Clice: Toward a More Creative Canadian
Policy on Culture, in COMMrARY, at 10, 1-36 (C.D. Howe Inst. 1997).
14 See Browne, supra note 8, at12.
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3. RESORTING TO PROTECTIONIST MEASURES TO
PRESERVE DOMESTIC CULTURAL INDUSTRIES THREATENED
BY MORE POWERFUL FOREIGN IMPORTERS
Culture is perhaps most vulnerable, and certainly no less valu-
able, 5 in countries whose domestic cultural products cannot com-
pete with foreign products in the absence of trade barriers1 6 Mar-
ket forces, in the absence of such barriers, are not sufficient to
protect domestic industries.' 7 In many cases, small domestic pro-
ducers simply cannot compete with foreign competitors who have
a lower cost per unit, amortized over much larger markets.18 Pro-
ducers can only earn the most money domestically,19 or possibly
from places where people speak the same language2O (if such
places exist), and then are forced to give a cultural discount to
other countries.21 This market reality gives the United States, as a
huge, nearly uniformly English speaking country, a sufficiently
large domestic advantage that it can afford to be an extensive ex-
porter. When domestic demand is spent, or stagnant, the United
States can easily look to, and in many cases dominate, overseas
markets.22
15 See id. at 3 ("Exports will mean nothing if Canadians lose the ability to
conduct national conversation within [its] own communication space."); Jacques
Attali, Fragile Cease Fire; Hollywood vs. Europe: Setting the Stage for the Next Round,
PHOENIX GAzErrE, Dec. 23,1993, at B7.
16 See Steven Greenhouse, For Europe, U.S. May Spell TV, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1989, at D1. For a discussion of U.S. cultural imperialism and how the French op-
pose a U.S. monopoly, not free trade, see Jonas M. Grant, Comment, Jurassic Trade
Dispute: The Exclusion of the Audiovisual Sector from the GATT, 70 IND. L.J. 1333,
1347-52(1995).
17 See Browne, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that sheltered production and distri-
bution companies are essential for new domestic talent to emerge).
18 See id. at4.
19 See William Pfaff, A Phony Farm War, with 'Cultural' Skirmishing, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 24,1993, at 8.
20 See Braun & Parker, supra note 4, at 160 (noting that the common language,
geographic proximity, and intertwined economies of Canada and the United
States make Canada especially vulnerable to U.S. "cultural" imports).
21 See Colin Hoskins et a]., Television and Film in a Freer International Trade En-
vironment: U.S. Dominance and Canadian Responses, in MASS MEDIA AND FREE TRADE,
supra note 5, at 63,69 ("[Ihe cultural-discount concept is the key to explaining the
competitive advantage conferred by market size. Also, any country that manages
to minimize the discount for its exports, or that applies a particularly large dis-
count to imports, has a trade advantage.").
22 See Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown Trade War, NAT'LJ., Feb. 23,1991, at 432-34.
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This market advantage has given the United States much free-
dom and power to maneuver within the global economy. As a re-
suit, many small economies have felt threatened by the influx of
U.S. imports in their markets. They have responded with protec-
tionist measures that are not only inconsistent with free trade, but
are undesirable given the new technology available to producers
and consumers, and the global nature of the market.
3.1. Cultural Protectionism Is Ultimately Neither Feasi~ble nor
Advantageous
3.1.1. Non-Feasibility of Protectionisnm
No amount of protectionism will extensively preserve culture
or truly promote more viable domestic industries. Technological
advances in interpersonal communication and a highly interde-
pendent global market have irreversibly affected culture and sov-
ereigntyP Foreign cultural influences inevitably infiltrate domes-
tic culture, whether through the hard-to-regulate Internet,24 the
black market, 5 or piracy.26 A study of the trade of cultural prod-
ucts at the Mexican-American border found that Mexican domestic
products remained viable. Furthermore, Mexican cultural identity
was retained notwithstanding the influx of outside products. Film,
23 For example, Canada was challenged by the United States each time it at-
tempted to protect its cultural products, and so was forced to "address interna-
tional trade rules or risk serious damage to the framework of support for cultural
industries that Canada had developed over the years." Browne, supra note 8, at 3.
24 See McAnany & Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 4,13 (noting that new technol-
ogy may make protectionist strategies impossible); cf. PETER LYMAN, CANADA'S
VIDEO REVOLUTION: PAY-TV, HoNE VIDEO AND BEYOND 31, 40 (1983) (warning that
technological advances in distribution methods of entertainment products will
make protectionist measures much less effective).
25 See Byun Eun-mi, Japan's Most Popular Cartoon Coming to Korea, KoEA
HERALD, June 17,1999 (describing how Pokemon's upcoming release in South Ko-
rea may lead to Japanese domination of the cartoon character market because ille-
gal Pokemon goods are already available and popular), available at 1999 WL
17750071.
26 See Jan D'Alessandro, Note, A Trade-Based Response to Intellectual Property
Piracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the Motion Picture Industry, 76 GEO. LJ. 417,426
(1988); Therese Anne Larrea, Comment, Eliminate the Cultural Industries Exemption
from NAFTA, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1107, 1143 (1997) ("Piracy is often a conse-
quence of a cultural industries exemption."); Ban on Japanese Films, Videos, Comics
Lifted, KOREA TIMEs, Oct. 20,1998 (noting that smuggled Japanese music is widely
available in South Korea and that it may be difficult to prevent imports of Japa-
nese pop music for much longer), available at 1998 WL 21403966.
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however, was a notable exception. There was such an influx of
U.S. films that consumers favored U.S. films over domestic films.27
This reality is consistent with cultural transmission theory. The
cultural transmission theory predicts that where outside products
will affect culture, they will do so regardless of tariffs,28 and where
there is not much connection between foreign products and do-
mestic values, foreign products will not affect those values. That
is, protectionism is not always necessary, and where it would be
desirable, consumer preferences will be determinative anyway. 29
Instead of fighting unavoidable cultural invasion, small cultural
industries should take advantage of the Internet and the interde-
pendent economy as a way to reach new customer bases.30
3.1.2. Disadvantages of Protectionism
In addition to being unfeasible, protectionism is not advanta-
geous. Comparative advantage theory predicts that protectionism
is only a short-term strategy to "stave off the inevitable" and is ul-
timately costly to society because it protects inefficient producers.31
Cultural industries should be forced to specialize in the absence of
protectionism to increase productivity.32 The U.S. open-market is
not the only successful one. Japan and other Asian countries like
South Korea were very successful in using a much more closed
market system to recover from war.33 However, the U.S. approach is
27 See McAnany & Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 23.
28 See Jamie Portman, Europeans Battle American Cultural Juggernaut in Trade
Talks, GAZETTE (Montreal), Oct. 6, 1993, at B3 ("Surely there is something inher-
ently suspect about any culture which has so alienated its citizens that only a gov-
ernment edict can keep them in touch with it.").
29 See Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade,
National Identity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
203, 241 (1998) (describing the cultural transmission theory which holds that
"truly invasive ideas [are] almost impossible to keep out").
30 See LYMAN, supra note 24, at 51-52; Robin L. Van Harpen, Mamas, Don't Let
Your Babies Grow Up to Be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165,182-83 n.93 (1995) (citing Jean d'Arcy, Direct Broadcast
Satellites and the Right to Communicate, in RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE 1, 5 (L.S. Harms
et al. eds., 1977)); Jim Carney, Revolution in the Airwaves, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 7,
1991, at D4.
31 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2-4 (1995) (explaining the theory of comparative advan-
tage); see Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97 (1994).
32 See STEVEN GLOBERMAN, XVII CULTURAL REGULATION IN CANADA 55 (1983).
33 Open markets during a time of recovery can lead to economic dislocation,
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likely the most advantageous strategy for economies not in a state
of immediate crisis. According to an economist commenting on
the Asian economies, "Once a certain level of economic recovery
occurred, the very attributes [of the more dosed market system]
that facilitated growth became counterproductive.... "3 Though
some companies may not be successful specializing within an open
market, either because the market can only sustain a limited num-
ber of specialists, or because foreign importers may specialize too,
free trade will benefit those cultural industries that are unique to a
country and that the country produces best.5
For example, low cost foreign products may actually allow lo-
cal cultural products distributors who can only afford to buy
mostly cheaper import products to stay in business?6f Similarly, if
foreign products are somewhat different from domestic ones in the
same industry, the foreign products may not replace or compete
with domestic ones.37 Instead, they may actually increase demand
for the domestic ones by reminding consumers that such a product
exists, but not competing directly with the domestic product.a3
Transnational partnerships can help introduce a country's native
products into international markets.39 Furthermore, cheap and
popular foreign products can be used to cross-subsidize domestic
products.40 Consequently, protectionism may actually be unprofit-
able.
Protectionism is also disadvantageous because it produces un-
desirable products, products that are not subject to competitive
standards. Further, industries may be fighting for protectionism
massive inflation, declines in gross domestic product, and increased social insta-
bility. See Interview by Frederic Smoler with Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor, Te
Poverty of Protectionism, 3 AuDAcITY 16-26 (1995), reprinted in A STREAM OF
WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECIONS ON TRADE, IWMIGRATION, AND DatmcRAcy 75,
83-84 (1998) (explaining that protectionism worked in Japan due to its focus on
international markets and policies that enabled it to progress economically despite
its isolation, and noting that in Japan as elsewhere only competition produces
positive trade results).
34 Larrea, supra note 26, at 1117-18; see Melissa Dowling, Mexico Group Crafts
U.S. Entry, CATALOG AGE, Jan. 1,1995, at 22.
35 See Larrea, supra note 26, at 1117-18; Dowling, supra note 34, at 22.
36 See Portman, supra note 28.
37 See Guy Stanley, Commentary on Cultural Goods and Services in International
Trade Law, in THE CULTURE/TRADE QUANDARY, supra note 8, at 150-54.
3 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
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while citizens want foreign products. 41 Protectionism is a form of
censorship42 and thus reduces citizens' choices. 43 Theorists and in-
dustry protectionists argue that citizens will not support a trade
regime that is inconsistent with the things they value, such as cul-
tural products.44 However, if protectionism does not actually pro-
mote viable cultural industries, or industries that produce desir-
able products, the GATT and other trade agreements' failure to
incorporate cultural protectionism will not affect those agreements'
legitimacy. Thus, to participate successfully in global trade, coun-
tries should avoid unfeasible, disadvantageous strategies, like
protectionism, which are antithetical to the more advantageous
strategy of free trade.
4. UNDESIRABLE PROTECTIONIST TRADE STRATEGIES PRECLUDED
DUE TO U.S. INFLUENCE AND PREVAILING ECONOMICS
4.1. Protectionist Trade Strategies Precluded by the United States'
Ability to Use the GATT/ITO to Adjudicate Trade Disputes
The United States has strategically avoided recognizing the
protectionist cultural exemptions in regional trade agreements
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement45 ("NAFTA")
by using the World Trade Organization's ("WTO") Dispute Panels
41 See LYMAN, supra note 24, at5O (maintaining that consumers want the latest
services and products); McAnany & Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 11 ("[Cultural
protection provided by trade rules must be distinguished from cultural resistance
that resides in audiences."); Michael Wallace Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad: Cultural
Variations Affecting Franchising Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 165, 180-81, 183 (1994)
(noting that it is often local competitors who are interested in protectionism; "the
protection of culture is clearly not consumer driven. It is promoted by business
and government. Given the opportunity, consumers often choose the foreign
product."); see, e.g., Attali, supra note 15; Barnaby J. Feeder, McDonald's Finds
There's Still Plenty of Room to Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,1994, at 5.
42 See Goodenough, supra note 29, at 234-35 (discussing the effects of Cana-
dian protectionism on free speech).
43 See Schwanen, supra note 13, at 15-16 (arguing that Canada's goal should be
choice). But see Perry, supra note 12 (noting that the European Union has made a
different argument regarding choice: protectionist strategies promote choice by
preserving the choice of domestic products, even as U.S. exports grow, which will
happen regardless of restrictions).
44 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
45 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. The Canadian cultural trade exemption in the
NAFTA is contained in NAFTA Annex 2106. See id. at 605.
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to address its trade concerns. Adjudicating disputes under the
WTO preempts resorting to NAFTA.46 Instead, the GAIT rules
control, and NAFTA's cultural exemptions are irrelevant 47
4.1.1. WVTO Adjudication Is Not Conducive to Protectionist
Measures
In addition to preempting regional protectionist measures, the
GATT rules have not been conducive to international protectionist
measures. The panels and appellate bodies of the WTO have
largely circumscribed any type of cultural protectionist or preser-
vationist argument by restricting their inquiries to certain narrow
economic factors. 48 The WTO cases under GATT imply that "only
the greater good of efficiency matter[s], " not socio-econonic fac-
tors or cultural values. 49
4.1.1.1. WATO Panels' Narrow Economic Focus
The WTO has avoided looking beyond economic factors to ad-
dress the lack of specificityo regarding cultural products5 ' within
international trade52 Its panels have largely refused to acknowl-
46 See id. Art 2005(1), (5)-(6).
47 See Richard L. Matheny, Comment, In the Wake of the Flood: "Like Products"
and Cultural Products After the World Trade Organization's Decision in Canada Cer-
tain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 245,246 (1938).
48 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 2 [hereinafter Un-
derstanding]; Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, GATT B.I.S.D.
94,111 (31st Supp.) at 94,111 (1985); EEC-Quantitative Restrictions Against Im-
ports of Certain Products from Hong Kong, July 12, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th
Supp.) at 129,138 (1984); Carmody, supra note 6, at 260-61 (describing how WTO
dispute resolution panels can only consider "covered agreements or agreements
cited by the parties to the dispute" using standard terms of reference, which do
not include the "more informal contexts in which cultural concerns arise") (quot-
ing Understanding, supra note 48, Art. 7.1); Nichols, supra note 44, at 660 ("The
World Trade Organization system, as currently envisioned, fails to take into ac-
count the fundamental nature of societal values, and creates little or no space in
which such laws can exist.").
49 Carmody, supra note 6, at 266-67.
50 The only international legal definition of cultural industry is in NAFTA:
"persons engaged in any of the following activities: (a) the publication, distribu-
tion, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals or newspapers in print or machine
readable form." NAFTA, supra note 45, Art. 2107,32 I.L.M. 605,701.
51 See Goodenough, supra note 29, at 237-39 (questioning whether there even
is such a thing as a distinctive Canadian culture).
52 See generally Browne, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing how culture/trade con-
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edge that culture may have a dual nature-that it often possesses
"a quantifiable monetary value," but "simultaneously represents
the essence of national sovereignty and thereby must be treated
differently than common tradable goods."5 3 The panels have also
ignored the fact that cultural products may also have a conflicting
nature; in some cases the content of a cultural product is a public
good, while its easily reproducible form is a private good.54 This
refusal to create specific rules for culture and cultural products re-
veals the WTO's reluctance to believe that governments that em-
ploy protectionist measures are trying to preserve and foster the
unique entity of culture, instead of merely trying to protect and
support commercial interests.55
4.1.1.2. Narrow Focus Has Largely Precluded Protectionist
Measures byd Members Under the Current System
4.1.1.2.1. National Treatment Obligation
The WTO's decisions directly reflect this reluctance to allow "a
Member to use "culture" as an excuse to provide commercial ad-
vantages to domestic producers. .. or, ... to evict foreign products
from its market."5 6 Under GATT rules, a member must treat goods
from another member as similar or "like" domestic goods.5 7 Spe-
cifically, GATT Article HI, the "national treatment obligation,"
prohibits a country from subjecting imported goods to taxes or
charges exceeding those on like domestic products or "directly
flicts "generally derive from a lack of specificity of cultural products from an in-
ternational trade perspective").
53 Braun & Parker, supra note 4, at 170 (discussing the European Commu-
nity's reasoning that culture is unlike other tradable goods).
54 See generally WTO, First Written Submission of Canada Submitted to the
Panel, Established by the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organiza-
tion to Examine Three Canadian Measures Concerning Periodicals, June 9, 1997,
available at 19XX WL 213177.
55 See Browne, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing the ambivalence related to the
reasoning behind the protection of cultural products).
56 WTO, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting of July
30,1997 (discussing Canada - Certain Measures), available at 1997 WL 908915 at *10.
57 GATT 1947, supra note 1; see WTO, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, June 30, 1997 [hereinafter Canada-Certain Measures], available at
1997 WL 371097 (W.T.O.).
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competitive or substitutable" products, even if the taxes or charges
have caused no proven material injury.3
4.1.1.2.2. Like Goods or Directly Competitive Rules
Under this rule, the legal issue is thus whether two goods are
like goods or directly competitive or substitutable products,5 9 not
whether a product has cultural significance. There is no precise
definition for "like products" because the responsibility of defining
this term was left to an organization that was never created.i As a
result, when countries disagreed over how to treat their respective
products, the WTO, which settles disputes arising under GATT 61
had to develop a way to determine whether the products were like
products.62
4.1.1.2.3. Narrow Application
The WTO dispute panels developed a very rigid system to
make this determination, which resulted in consistently narrow
panel decisions that ultimately precluded decisions based on the
cultural context of a product. Factors and issues that the WTO dis-
pute panels may consider are circumscribed by the Rules and Pro-
cedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes6 an individual
panel may neither add factors to its determination, nor signifi-
cantly broaden the scope of its inquiry."4 Initially, to determine
whether products were like products, panels used a mechanical
approach that focused on end-uses and physical characteristics. 5
They could consider the following and similar factors on a case-by-
5 GAIT 1947, supra note 1, Art I; see EEC Measures on Animal Feed Pro-
teins, Mar. 14,1978, GATT B.IS.D. (25th Supp.) at 49 (1979).
59 See Matheny, supra note 47, at 250 (discussing the significance of a finding
of "likeness").
60 William J. Snape, I & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GATT's Enriron-
mental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "Due Process"?, 27 CORNELL INr'L
L.J. 777, 792 (1994) (examining the consequences of the International Trade Or-
ganization not coming into existence).
61 See Understanding, supra note 48, Art. 17.
62 See id. Art. 23.
63 Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 14,1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 2.
64 See id.
65 See Matheny, supra note 47, at 251 (quoting James H. Snelson, Can GAIT
Article III Recover from its Head-on Collision with United States-Taxes on Automo-
biles?, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 467,480 (1996)).
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case basis:66 (1) the product's end-uses in a given market; (2) con-
sumers' tastes and habits; and (3) the product's properties, nature,
and quality.67 The panels briefly used an intent-based, "aims and
effect" test that found two products to be like products only when
the purpose of the tax was "to afford protection to domestic pro-
duction."68 Any legitimate policy objective negated a "bad in-
tent,"69 thus allowing a cultural protectionist rationale to negate the
reality that the tax afforded protection to domestic production.
This test was abandoned, however, in the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages case, which stated that Japan could not use its Liquor Tax
Law to impose higher taxes on certain imported alcohol.70 It is un-
likely that this intent-based test will ever be used again."
4.1.1.2.4. Ignoring the Like Products Rule
After restricting the factors considered regarding like products
in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the WTO limited its national
treatment obligation inquiry even further, making it even more
narrowly focused on only economic considerations. 72 In Canada -
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, consistent with its sound
rejection of the aims-and-effect like products consideration, the
WTO Panel entirely ignored the like products analysis.73 It focused
even more narrowly on only the directly competitive or substitut-
able products analysis.74
The Canadian periodicals case was in response to Canadian
protectionist measures that imposed taxes on imported maga-
zines.75 The WTO Appellate Body decided that Canada's tax on
certain periodicals was inconsistent with GATT Article I176 be-
66 See WTO, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Oct. 4, 1996 [hereinafter
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages], available at 1996 WL 910779 (W.T.O) at 25,
27-28.
67 See Matheny, supra note 47, at 251 (quoting Canada - Certain Measures).
68 Id. at 251-52 (quoting Snelson, supra note 65, at 487,495).
69 Id. at 252.
70 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 66.
71 See Matheny, supra note 47, at 267 (stating that the tenor and circumstances
of Canada - Certain Measures makes a return to an intent-based analysis unlikely).
72 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 66.
73 Canada -Certain Measures, supra note 57.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 GATT 1947, supra note 1.
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cause the magazines at issue were "directly competitive."77 The
Appellate Body avoided the like products analysis altogether by
finding that the Panel's like products decision was an "inadequate
factual analysis."78
Instead, the Appellate Body applied the "directly competitive"
test.79 This strictly economic test applies a cross-price elasticity as-
sessment to determine whether the products in question have
common end-uses.8 0 Compared with the like products clause, the
directly competitive clause "mo[re] unambiguously embodies the
ideal of unfettered global free trade,"81 because it focuses on the
competitive relationship of the products and not their underlying
characteristics. The Panel thus rejected the content-based and
contextual analysis Canada wanted in favor of the broad obliga-
tions the United States wanted to use to encourage international
competition.8 2
Other panels have similarly indicated that they view consum-
ers solely as "economic creatures", and have shown "distaste" for
"anything remotely traditional."83 In a more recent case about
whether the tax treatment of directly competitive products was "so
as to afford protection" to domestic products, Chile - Taxes on Alco-
holic Beverages,81 a WTO Panel found that even taxation not based
in any way on origin 3 was done "so as to afford protection" if the
actual effect of the taxation was to tax imports at a substantially
higher rate than directly competitive domestic products.6 The
Panel cited the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages decision to reit-
77 Matheny, supra note 47, at 261-62 (outlining GATT 1947 Article 11m:2).
78 Canada- Certain Measures, supra note 57, at *8.
79 Id.
So See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECOO.%MICS 31-32 (5th
ed. 2001) (explaining price and demand elasticity); Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, supra note 66 (describing cross price elasticity as how demand for one
good reacts when the price of the other good is changed; it is used to measure
commonality of end-uses or the competitiveness of products).
81 Matheny, supra note 47, at 265.
82 See id. at 247.
83 Carmody, supra note 6, at 273-74 (ascribing to non-economic factors "an
indeterminacy that precludes reliance upon them") (quoting Japan-Customs
Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages,
Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 117 (1987)).
84 WTO, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Dec. 13, 1999 [hereinafter
Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages], available at 1999 WL 1186272 (W.T.O.).
85 Id. Taxation was based on alcohol content See id.
86 See id.
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erate that "[a]lthough it is true that the aim of a measure may not
be easily ascertained, nevertheless its protective application can
most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the
revealing structure of a measure."87 The test adopted by the Panel
was essentially whether or not there was de facto discrimination
against imported products, a determination based solely on eco-
nomic factors. 88 Thus, the substantive precedent established by the
panels is far from conducive to protecting domestic cultural prod-
ucts -they will not tolerate even facially neutral 9 taxes where the
ultimate economic effect is to tax non-domestic products at a higher
rate.
4.1.2. Process Barriers to Protectionism
In addition to substantive legal barriers to protectionism, there
are process barriers that render the WTO adjudicatory system an
undesirable forum for negotiating controversial cultural products
issues. Although it incorporates the GATT system, the WTO panel
system decisions are more final. Panel decisions are almost auto-
matically adopted, which "effectively transform[s] dispute settle-
ment from a diplomatic, mediative process to a binding adjudica-
tory process."90 This less diplomatic, more binding process
perpetuates the substantive narrowness of the WTO panel system.
Thus, the GATT, as it is presently implemented under the WTO, is
not a likely vehicle for protectionist treatment of culture and cul-
tural products.
4.2. Non-Adjudicative Trade Strategies That Are Difficult or
Impossible to Achieve and Undesirable Due to Their Protectionist
Nature
However, the WTO panels have not entirely ruled out the pos-
sibility of preserving culture. Though clearly a strong statement
against protectionist measures, the Canada - Certain Measures Con-
cerning Periodicals decision is qualified. The WTO noted that its
87 Id. at *12 (citing Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages).
88 Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 84, at *5.
89 Id.
90 Nichols, supra note 44, at 700 (citing G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE
L.J. 829,858 (1995)).
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ruling was not a general challenge to policies that protect a coun-
try's cultural identity.91 However, as described above, there are
few options to do so under the GATT.92 Furthermore, WTO adju-
dication has not provided guidance as to how countries might
protect their cultural industries and still conform to the new rules
for trade in services. 3 Amendments, waivers, exceptions, and
even permitted subsidies under the GATT and the WTO may not
be possible, and even if they are possible, they are disadvanta-
geous to the extent that they are inconsistent with free trade prin-
ciples.9
4.2.1. Amendment or Waiver to the GATT Is Unlikely
Unrestricted free trade, which is the purpose of the GATT, is
likely to prevail over any protectionist attempts to amend or waive
provisions of the agreement.95 Logistically, the GATT as adminis-
tered by the WTO is only slightly easier to amend than the GATT
itself, and neither is very easy to amend. Many smaller and less
powerful members of the agreement would have to gain enough
influence within the WTO to subjugate the free trade desires of su-
perpowers like the United States. Substantively, as the WTO panel
proceedings have illustrated, protectionist measures are unlikely to
be incorporated into the GATT because they are contrary to the
agreement's central purpose of promoting unrestricted trade.
Further, this purpose is unlikely to be abandoned since it is con-
sistent with prevailing economic values.
91 Canada-Certain Measures, supra note 57, at *9.
92 See Aaron Scow, The Sports Illustrated Canada Controversy: Canada "Stn7xks
Out" in Its Bid to Protect Its Periodical Industry from U.S. Split-Run Periodicals, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 245, 280 (1998). For a discussion of how the emergency
safeguards under the GATT are not sufficient to save cultural products, see Ivan
Bernier, Cultural Goods and Services in International Trade Lao, in THE
CULTURE/TRADE QUANDARY, supra note 8, at 108,121-22,129.
93 See Taxation: Canada to Accept WTO Ruling on Magazine Industry Policy, IfT'L
TRADE REP. (Americas/NAFTA), Sept. 3,1997, available at WL 14 LTR 1469.
94 Measures that are contrary to free trade are undesirable because they are
inefficient. For example, see the discussion above about protectionist measures.
95 See the WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at 6; GENERAL AGRIAENT , O.
TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE PoucIEs FOR A BErrER FUTURE PROFOSAtS FOR AcrioN4
23 (1985); Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1164-66 (2nd ed. 1937).
96 See EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONALTRADE REGULATION1.24 (1995).
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4.3. Prevailing Economic Values
Countries that have a lot of economic power do not feel that
culture is threatened by free trade,97 and thus do not want to use
the WTO to "artificially" promote cultural autonomy.98 They ar-
gue that protectionist measures are not meant to protect culture,
but are attempts to create unfair advantages for domestic indus-
tries.99 They also point out that protectionism by its nature focuses
on ownership of products, but such a focus will not ensure that the
content of the products truly represents domestic culture.100 Free
trade rules, on the other hand, do not focus on origin; like products
are treated alike regardless of their origin.101 Further, as discussed
above, such rules also encourage viable industries instead of pre-
serving inefficient businesses and forced consumerism, and thus
are ultimately more conducive to promoting domestic cultural in-
dustries than protectionism. The United States and other free trade
proponents do not want to set inefficient, non-free trade prece-
dents that the European Union or Asia may then try to follow and
expand.02
Additionally, the United States and other free trade proponents
do not want the WTO to "nmcromanage world social policy," given
the lack of an international consensus on such issues. Also, there
will be non-global issues that are outside the scope of the WTO but
that still affect culture. Thus, the likelihood of conflict among
members will increase.103 Often when countries do address and try
97 See Carmody, supra note 6, at 251-52; Van Harpen, supra note 30, at 177-78.
98 Carmody, supra note 6, at 251-52.
99 See Lance Gay, Europe Eating Up U.S. Films, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan.
25,1994, at All; Hollywood Is Left on the Cutting Room Floor, DAILY MAIL (London),
Dec. 15, 1993, at 10; Susan Lowry, Why They Were So Right to Fight, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 15, 1993, at 21; Daniel Talbot, Use Junk to Bankroll Art,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,1994, at A17.
100 See Bernard Ostry, Culture and Trade: One Policy/No Options, in THE
CULTURE/TRADE QUANDARY, supra note 8, at 17-24; Schwanen, supra note 13; Peter
Passell, Is France's Cultural Protection a Handy-Dandy Trade Excuse?, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 6,1994, at D2.
101 See Carmody, supra note 6, at 240 ("The problem with recognizing culture
is that recognition is counter to a key premise of free trade, namely, that origin
does not matter.").
102 See Stokes, supra note 22, at 436; Bernard Weinraub, Clinton Spared Blame
by Hollywood Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,1993, at Dl.
103 Nichols, supra note 44, at 695-96.
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to protect culture, they do so through unwritten law,"4 poorly
drafted laws with unclear cultural definitions,1 03 or individual do-
mestic laws' 06 that the GATT regime is not equipped to address.
Thus, the dominating free trade proponents are unlikely to con-
cede to those who favor protectionist amendments or waivers.
U.S. views will also likely be perpetuated because WTO mem-
bers must "use, among the measures reasonably available to
[them], that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with
other GATT provisions."'107 Members are directed to favor meas-
ures that will result in "efficient non-discrinination."10 This un-
fettered trade outcome is most consistent with both the rules of
GATT, under which "non-trade concerns are subordinate to trade
concerns,"1 09 and the "pre-eminent value of international trade
rules," which is wealth maximization. 10
4.3.1. Free Trade Justifications
This unequivocal preference for unfettered free trade will en-
dure, not only because it is explicitly perpetuated by GAYT rules,
but because it is the prevailing, extensively justified orientation of
the world's most influential markets. These markets have rejected
moral rights arguments about cultural products as leading to a
"cultural conservatism""' or cultural paternalism" 2 dictated by the
104 See Gordon, supra note 41, at 168 (recalling the account of a Brazilian law-
yer. "When you are with a [Brazilian] government official seeking approval of a
foreign investment sometimes the official pulls open a drawer and takes out a to-
tally unknown regulation; sometimes the drawer remains shut.").
105 See id. at 170,181.
'10 See Nichols, supra note 44, at 687 (citing ROBERT STOREY Er AL, NORTH-EAsr
ASIA ON A SHOESTRNG 364 (3rd ed. 1992)); Dorine R. Seidman, Transtorder Data
Flow: Regulation of International Infornmtion Flow and the Brazilian Example, 1 J.L &
TECH. 31, 36 (1986); Chris Bulloch, Satellites Jostle for Slots over Asia, kNmR AVIA Bus.
& TEcH., Apr. 1995, at 45.
107 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1939, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345,393 (1990). The WTO incorporates the GAIT and its
precedent WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Art. XVI (1).
103 Carmody, supra note 6, at304.
109 Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection
Policy, 66 Ta'P. L. REv. 751,752 (1993); see Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock,
The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labour and the Environment, in EcONOmic
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Alan 0. Sykes & Jagdeep S. Bhandir eds., 1996).
110 Carmody, supra note 6, at 233-35 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoONmIc
ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 21 (3rd ed. 1986)).
"I Carl I-L Settlemyer Ill, Note, Between Thought and Possession: Artists' "Moral
Rights" and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEo. LJ. 2291, 2303-10 (1993) (noting
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government.13 Instead, they espouse the strictly economic com-
parative advantage theory.114 This theory posits that it is most effi-
cient for countries to trade goods they can most efficiently pro-
duce, and that the absence of consumer choice is inefficient. 15
Without consumer choice, "[c]onsumers must pay higher prices
because producers receive something they are not entitled to-the
patronage of consumers who would otherwise choose to buy the
products of foreign producers." 116 Free trade does not only protect
consumers, though; it also protects creators and producers. Con-
sistent with individual rights, free trade preserves the right of a
creator, who owns the product of his labor, to trade it to others if
he so desires. 17 These philosophical justifications underlie both
the GATT and international free trade in general.
In addition, countries that practice and scholars"8 who pro-
mote free trade also point out the many more concrete advantages
of free trade including: (1) greater consumer satisfaction due to an
increase in the variety of goods; (2) decreased monopolistic power
of domestic firms; (3) increased technical efficiency due to a de-
crease in average production costs; (4) decreased unemployment
due to reduced imperfections in the labor market; (5) augmented
economic growth through a release of capital resources from the
distorted sector;119 (6) increased livelihood and satisfaction as the
that in the absence of free trade, expression is inhibited as if there were censor-
ship).
112 See Fred Koenigsberg & Joan T. Pinaire, Impact of International Copyright
Developments in U.S. Practice, in GLOBAL TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 523, 533
(Practicing Law Inst. ed., 1994).
113 See MARK VAN DOREN, MAN'S RIGHT TO KNOWLEDGE AND THE FREE USE
THEREOF 37 (1953) ("No official yet born on this earth is wise enough or generous
enough to separate good ideas from bad ideas, good beliefs from bad beliefs.").
114 Comparative advantage theory does not account for externalities. See
THOMAS A. KLEIN, SOCIAL COST AND THE BENEFITS OF BUSINESS 7 (1977); J.R.
McCULLOcH, THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO 76 (1888).
115 See MCCULLOCH, supra note 114; KLEIN, supra note 114.
116 Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States
with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
539,552(1993).
117 See id. at 551-52 (regarding the individual rights argument for free trade).
118 See Nichols, supra note 44, at 665-67 (summarizing theorists' arguments for
free trade).
119 See JUNIcHI Goro, LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON JAPANESE-AMERICAN ISSUES 82 (1990); see also McGee, supra note
116, at 550.
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wealth from free trade is used to help people live longer, healthier
lives; 20 (7) better ability to care for the environment through in-
creased wealth;21 ' (8) increased contact and cooperation between
countries and thus fewer wars;22 (9) accelerated technological
growth through shared knowledge;2 3 and (10) more developed
economies because free trade allows countries to amass wealth and
technology as well as to expand their markets. 24 Overall, advo-
cates of free trade point out that a large amount of the wealth ac-
quired in the world since the 1940s is a result of liberalized trade.123
Again, in light of these realities, it is unlikely that the world's
wealthiest and most powerful economies will abandon a wealth
maximization system that has been so lucrative for them.
Thus, even where preservation of culture is recognized in in-
ternational law and the theories behind it,126 this recognition is
limited to reflect the theory of economic efficiency that underlies
U.S. export aspirations and the GATT trade arrangement and dis-
pute settlement rhetoric. For example, although the GATT national
treatment obligations generally apply to all products, audiovisual
12 See George D. Smith & Matthias Egger, Socioeconomic Differentials in Wealth
and Health, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 1085,1085 (1993).
121 See Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging t1 Debate,
23 ENvm. L. 475 (1993).
122 See McGee, supra note 116, at 551.
123 See Anne 0. Krueger, Trade Policy as an Input to Development, 70 AM. Eco.
REv. 288,290 (1980).
124 See James Riedel, Trade as an Engine of Growth: Theory and Evidence, in
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 25, 26-29 (David Greenaway
ed., 1988).
125 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 7-9 (1988) ("Indeed, few phenom-
ena in economics can be explained by reference to single causes. But this does not
rule out the possibility and indeed the overwhelming probability, that diminish-
ing trade barriers were a major contributory force in postwar expansion of in-
comes."); ANNE 0. KRUEGER, PERSPECnIVES ON TRADE AND DEvELOPMENT 206-12
(1990); ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sr-
CENTURY CAPITAUSM 113 (1991).
126 The global international law framework recognizes the autonomy of its
members, as well as perpetuates this myth of equality within its agreements.
Similarly, cultural pluralism is inherent in the global legal order. As a result,
culture has in the past inspired "specific, non-economic interests protected by in-
ternational law." Matheny, supra note 47, at 258 ("Culture, though itself a concept
of inestimable complexity customarily has given rise to specific, non-economic
interests protected by international law."); see also Braun & Parker, supra note 4, at
160 ("Culture and economics are inextricably intertwined, so changes in one will
necessarily effect changes in the other."). See generally OPENHEM.'S INTE-
NATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 87-88.
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products have been exempted. However, this exemption was bit-
terly fought for because it is contrary to unfettered free trade,127
and is unlikely to be expanded due to staunch U.S. opposition. 128
Thus, further exemption, amendment, or waiver to the GATT is
possible, but unlikely.
4.3.2. Amendment or Waiver to the GATT Is Undesirable
4.3.2.1. General Inefficiency
Given the prevailing free trade ethic of international trade and
the extensive advantages of free trade, even if protectionist meas-
ures were possible, they would still be undesirable. Protectionist
amendments, waivers, exceptions, safeguards, and subsidies to
promote domestic cultural industries, and culture in general, often
impede efficient, profitable trade.
Overarching protectionist measures may impede other advan-
tageous strategies trading countries would like to employ; differ-
entiating between foreign and domestic products based on origin
may preclude countries from using the few efficient restrictive
measures that must exist so that countries will not abuse each
other.129 For example, if one argues that foreign products are not
like products, antidumping measures cannot be applied to the for-
eign products.130
Additionally, protectionist measures are themselves inefficient,
or even impossible, means to promote viable industries. As a con-
cept, exceptions are questionable, having no clear definition in in-
127 See 'Agreed to Disagree': GATT Goes Forward by Dropping TV and Film Issues,
COMM. DAILY, Dec. 15, 1993, at 2; EC and U.S. Fail to Break Deadlock Over Farm Ac-
cord, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Oct 14, 1993, at 6; Peter Gumbel, France Sees Payoff from
GATT Stance, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,1993, at 8 (discussing similar debates over
trade restrictions on agriculture).
128 See Peter Behr, U.S., EC Negotiators Reach Last-Minute Accord on Trade,
GAZE=Ir (Montreal), Dec. 15, 1993, at A9; Dennis Wharton, Clinton Pledges GATT
Support to Hollywood, VARIETY, Oct. 25,1993, at 69. The exemption for audiovisual
products will more likely be weakened or rejected than expanded. The United
States recently reiterated to the WTO its intent to negotiate for a much less restric-
tive stance towards trading audiovisual products. See Ravi Kanth, Services: U.S.
Unveils Negotiating Proposals for New ATO Accord on Services Trade, BNA INT'L
TRADE DALY, Jan. 3, 2001.
129 See Browne, supra note 8, at 12.
130 See id.
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ternational law.131 Further, they are logistically of limited useful-
ness. Under GATT, exceptions only apply if a substantive provi-
sion is breached, each exception is carefully defined, and excep-
tions are interpreted narrowly. 3 2 Waivers, on the other hand, are
unilateral and flexible. However, waivers also require "excep-
tional circumstances"'33 and consensus or a three-fourths majority
to even be created. 34
4.3.2.2. Specific Proposals
Thus, specific proposals to amend the GATT or establish a
waiver should not be attempted or adopted. For example, Richard
L. Matheny proposes amending GATT Article III to read: "Where
a dispute concerns a cultural product,13 however, the complaining
Member will be required to establish violations under both the first
sentence ("like products" clause) and the second sentence ("di-
rectly competitive" clause) of Article 1:2 in order to justify a find-
ing in its favor."'36 To complement this framework, he then sug-
gests a like products analysis that considers end-use, intellectual
content, subject matter, perspective, and consumer perception,
among other factors. 37 This system would be more consistent with
the comparative advantage theory on which free trade is basedus
because the United States can compete with foreign cultural prod-
ucts. But this amendment is still undesirable, because it limits the
131 See Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Dec. 5,1939,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 84-85 (1990) [hereinafter Canada-Ice Cream and
Yoghurt]; Carmody, supra note 6, at 309-10 (citing Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d
876, 882 (6th Cir. 1944) and WTO Panel Report, United States-Standards for Re-
formulated and Conventional Gasoline, Gan. 29, 1996), 35 I.LM. 274 at 621-22
(1996)).
132 See, e.g., Canada-Ice Cream and Yoghurt, supra note 131; Carmody, supra
note 6, at 309-10 (citing Gatliff Coal Co., 142 F.2d at 309-10 ard Coal Co. v. Cox,
142 F.2d 876,882 (6th Cir. 1944) and WTO Panel Report, United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Gan. 29,1996), 35 I.LM. 274 at 621-
22(1996)).
133 GATT 1994, supra note 1, Art. IX (4).
134 WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Art. IX (3)(a)-(b).
135 See Matheny, supra note 47 at 273 (defining cultural product as simultane-
ously public (easily duplicated at little cost) and private (excludable) with content
that is "in some minimal sense 'cultural"').
136 Id. at 275.
137 See id.
133 See discussion infra Section 4.3.1.
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United States to competing by using foreign content. Otherwise,
the United States would still be subject to discriminatory taxes.
1 39
Similarly, other proposals to limit free trade by amending the
GATT would not be advantageous. Chi Carmody criticizes two
proposals to make new GATT-type rules for cultural products140
She points out that Philip M. Nichols, 141 who advocates rules that
focus on the purpose of trade restrictions,142 and Michael Braun
and Leigh Parker, who argue for trade arrangements that reflect
the unique nature of cultural goods,143 fail to define which prod-
ucts would be covered by a GATT amendment or waiver. 144 Car-
mody also asserts that Nichols, Braun, and Parker propose lan-
guage that is as unclear as the concept of cultural products.145 The
alternate cultural waiver to the GATT that Carmody proposes is
similarly complex and protectionist.146 None of these alternatives
to the present WTO/GATT system is desirable.
4.3.3. Subsidies and Selective Safeguards
Subsidies also have limited Utility. 14 7 Governments must have
money in order to provide subsidies, and even then their efforts
will only alter economic conditions. This means that subsidies will
only be effective where price alone determines demand.148 Also,
139 See Matheny, supra note 47, at 276. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN,
AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE (1996).
140 See Carmody, supra note 6, at 307-08.
141 Nichols' exception to the GATT would preserve some laws that violate the
terms of the WTO if the rules impede trade only incidentally, and are "enacted or
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting an underlying social value." Nichols, su-
pra note 44, at 660.
142 See id. at 714.
143 See Braun & Parker, supra note 4.
144 See Carmody, supra note 6, at 307-08.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 312.
147 See Tyler Cowen, Why France Needs Free Trade for Film, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
July 15, 1998, at 6 (arguing that subsidized movie makers can get away with
making unpopular products and that subsidy monies sometimes end up subsi-
dizing international companies anyway). But see Van Harpen, supra note 30, at
191-93 (supporting the use of only the GATT 1947 Art. III:8(b) and no other pro-
tectionist measures, or if not subsidies possibly price-based protections equivalent
to tariffs; stating that such subsidies "permit the price mechanism to function and
thereby reward efficiency and quality" and "are visible and thus easier to negoti-
ate.").
148 See Carmody, supra note 6, at 305.
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only price elastic goods can be subsidized under the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.1 49 Additionally,
subsidies may limit the freedom and objectivity of products subsi-
dized. 5 0
Selective safeguards are similarly not feasible. They inevitably
produce inefficient protectionism.51 Whereas nondiscrimination is
economically sound because it restricts imports from inefficient
sources, selectivity is detrimentally based on political clout. 12 Se-
lective restrictions encourage protectionism because there are
fewer international ramifications when only selected people are
discriminated against, so it is easier to be protectionist.'s Further,
selective quotas are detrimental to the industries they are supposed
to help. Those importers who are not discriminated against will
increase their imports, and thus even if the country selectively ex-
cludes more and more supplying countries, the level of imports
will ultimately remain equal to a nondiscrimination situation.5
Also, extensive globalization makes it difficult, if not impractical,
to select specific sources of imports to exclude' 55
Such "managed trade is the antithesis of GATT principles,"'ss
and thus is as impractical as it is undesirable. As noted above,
even non-selective safeguards, cultural exemptions, or waivers are
objectionable 5 7 In fact, even bilateral and regional free trade
agreements can ultimately be detrimental. They are preferential to
their members and thus may lead to protectionism and a burden-
some "maze" of trade restrictions 5 ss Though it is an oversimplifi-
cation to wholeheartedly espouse multilateral WTO sanctioned
149 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A, Art. 6.1(a). Carmody explains that the
numerical qualifications in Section 6.1(a) necessitate that only price elastic goods
be subsidized. See Carmody, supra note 6, at306.
150 See Cowen, supra note 147 (noting that subsidies were first provided as
part of a facist plan to control the content of the movies).
151 See Robert Baldwin & Jagdish Bhagwati, Te Dangers of Selective Saeguards,
FIN. TnMms, Jan. 10, 1990 [hereinafter Baldwin & Bhagwati], reprinted in A Srxmi
oF WINDOWS, supra note 33, at 109-12.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 112.
157 See Browne, supra note 8, at 6.
153 See Baldwin & Bhagwati, supra note 152, at 111.
2001]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
treaties'5 9 as the only alternative,160 promotion is ultimately better
than protection.' 6'
5. PROMOTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROTECTIONISM
However, although protectionism is neither practical nor desir-
able as a long-term or overarching strategy, engaging in unfettered
trade at all stages of a country's economic development is incon-
sistent with preserving culture and cultural products where there
are marked inequalities of wealth and power between countries in
the global economy. And such preservation remains an important
goal. It thus is necessary to identify and use strategies that are
most conducive to successful participation in international trade,
but that will also afford some long-term viability to cultural in-
dustries. A sort of limited, transitory, small-scale, and informal
protectionism meant to promote struggling or emerging economies
can be used to preserve cultural products even where the ultimate
goal is largely unfettered free trade.
Emerging Asian economies are illustrative, as they have found
that subsidies and isolationism are not ultimately advantageous,
but that a direct transition to full participation in multilateral free
trade is equally disastrous. Instead, they have begun to establish
regional trade areas similar to the European Union in order to
promote their economies and gain influence within international
trade. 62 Within these regional and bilateral trade agreements, the
countries are still fighting to preserve their cultures, but on a more
informal and autonomous level.163 The parties each demand a
159 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Preferential Trade Agreements: The Wrong Road, in
LAW AND POuCY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 865-71 (1996), reprinted in A STREAM
OF WINDOWS, supra note 33, at 289-97.
160 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Japan Must Now Say No, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993,
reprinted in A STREAM OF WINDOWS, supra note 33, at 190-92 (arguing that Japan
should reject U.S. attempts toward negotiating a managed trade agreement, as
such an arrangement would ensure that the United States has a part of the Japa-
nese market, and the agreement would restrict U.S. export opportunities as well;
multilateral equality is best).
161 See Browne, supra note 8, at 7.
162 See, e.g., Byun Eun-mi, President Kim's Visit to Moscow to Take Cultural Ex-
change to a New Height, KOREA HERALD, May 30,1999 (describing recent South Ko-
rean efforts to exchange culture with the Russians and quoting a South Korean
citizen, Hong Sa-jong: "The influx of Russian performing arts has helped Koreans
to develop a diverse taste in foreign culture, breaking away from their depend-
ency on the United States and Europe."), available at 1999 WL 17749471.
163 See, e.g., East Asia Vision Group Talks Stress Regional Cooperation, KOREA
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large amount of freedom in trade, but regions or trade partners can
simultaneously invest in and support each other, thereby increas-
ing the viability of their own domestic markets. Building from a
somewhat selective regional agreement will allow them some time
to build up their resources to the point where they can ultimately
participate in more unfettered, multilateral free trade without sac-
rificing their vulnerable domestic cultural industries.
5.1. South Korea and Japan: A Case Study
5.1.1. Efforts to Establish Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements
South Korea and Japan's recent efforts to establish first a bilat-
eral trade arrangement, and then possibly a regional one that in-
cludes China 6M and other East Asian countries,165 and even a much
broader one with the European Union,1 66 demonstrate a much less
protectionist strategy than isolationism, waivers, or other trade
strategies discussed above. Instead of continuing to isolate their
economies, 67 or pursuing further large-scale international protec-
tion for cultural industries, these two countries are trying to pro-
mote their cultural industries by strengthening them within a nar-
rower context, a context in which they may move towards fuller
HERALD, Oct 22,1999 (describing South Korea, China, and Japan's plans to launch
a regional consultative body), available at 1999 WL 29056011; Insulting Language
Games in Japan, KOREA HERALD, July 14, 1999 (noting that Japan plans to have a
free trade agreement with South Korea), available at 1999 WL 17750346; Korea-Japan
Panel on Promoting Cultural Exchanges Launched, KoREA HERALD, June 19,1999 (de-
scribing Japan and South Korea's plans to have a cultural exchange conference,
and South Korea's plans to lift its ban on Japanese popular culture), available at
1999 WL 17750151.
164 See Korea-Japan Free Trade Agreement on Track Towards Cooperation, KOEA
HERALD, May 31, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17749526; Anthony Rowley, Japan, S.
Korea to Finalise Trade Accord This Year, Bus. TINEs (Singapore), Oct. 28,1999, at 18.
165 See Shin Yong-bae, Idea of Creating E. Asia Bloc Gaining Momentum; Gov-
ernment Leaders, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 27, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27395579.
More recently there have even been talks of including North Korea in the regional
trading bloc. See Chon Shi-yong, Kim Holds Summit Talks with Leaders of Four Major
Powers, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27395214.
166 Europe, Asia to Launch Joint Financial Cooperation Project, KYoDo NE.'s, Dec.
26, 2000 (noting that Asian and European countries are working together to de-
velop the "Kobe Research Project" which will explore ways to stabilize currency
and foreign exchange markets), available at WL JWIRE 22:57:00.
167 See Rowley, supra note 164.
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participation in international free trade without entirely sacrificing
their domestic cultural industries.168
Though these new trade arrangements will not be easily or
quickly achieved, their ramifications are potentially very advanta-
geous. 169 South Korea and Japan have not always had a civil rela-
tionship'0 South Korea was dominated by Japanese imperialism
from 1910 until 1945, a subordination for which Japan only recently
apologized.71 After 1945, South Korea prohibited Japanese popu-
lar culture altogether172 In recent years significant trade barriers
between these two countries have persisted.13 For example, in
1994, Japanese movies were still banned in South Korea to protect
both the South Korean movie industry and the traditional cultural
values of South Korean youth."74 As recently as 1999, despite in-
ternational trends of regionalism, South Korea and Japan remained
the only two countries not participating in regional trade arrange-
ments.175
However, despite large trade imbalances similar to those expe-
rienced by Canada and the United States, South Korea and Japan
are now slowly taking advantage of their geographical and cultural
168 See It's a First Step Toward Reconciliation, Bus. KOREA, Apr. 1, 1999, available
at 1999 WL 12435522.
169 See Courting Japan, KOREA TRADE & INV., Jan. 9, 1999, available at 1999 WL
9206646.
170 See id.
17 See id.
172 See id.
173 See Chon Shi-yong, Kim Expects 'Epochal' Change in S-N Ties, KOREA
HERALD, May 8, 1999 (noting that the GATT, the Uruguay Round, and U.S.-
Canada agreements allow countries to have some protections for their cultural
markets), available at 1999 WL 17748923; Kwon Young-min, Korea-Japan Free Trade
Agreement on Track Towards Cooperation, KOREA HERALD, May 31, 1999 (noting that
significant trade barriers existed as recently as 1999), available at 1999 WL
17749526.
174 See Cultural Evolution? S. Korea: Uruguay Round Trade Agreement Will
Probably Lead to Wider Variety of Foreign Films & Cultural Influences in S. Korea, Bus.
KOREA, Jan. 1,1994, at 33.
Domestic producers argue that screen quotas have enabled domestic film
producers to establish themselves and to be profitable, while others argue that
"artificial protection has not motivated movie makers to pursue creative ideas,
technical innovation, or originality." Lee So-Yon, Movie Trade Dispute Draws on
Many Characters, Bus. KOREA, Jan. 1, 1999, at 24 ("In spite of thirty-three years un-
der the screen quota, the Korean film industry still hasn't narrowed the gap with
other countries.") (quoting Professor Sang-han Wang).
175 See Young-min, supra note 173 (noting that sixty percent of world trade is
influenced by regional trade arrangements).
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proximity and their shared history.176 When faced with financial
crises, the countries' officials'77 decided to work together to im-
prove both countries' economies. 178 South Korea's financial crisis
in 1997 "presented the incoming administration.., with a vastly
changed set of priorities... [and] the need to boost foreign direct
investment as the only means to restore economic health." 79 South
Korea asked Japan to invest more in its economy and ended its
fifty-three year ban on Japanese popular culture.D Japan officially
apologized for its prior imperialism and expressed its desire to
work with South Korea.81 Japan hopes to use a free trade area
with South Korea to "redress its country's trade imbalances."18'
Both countries no longer plan to avoid preferential trading or in-
vestment arrangements, and had set as their goal to finish reports
on a free trade and investment plan by the end of 1999.183
5.1.2. Domestic Industries Withzin Bilateral Agreenents
Despite these clear movements towards a bilateral free trade
agreement, and the countries' eagerness to gain access to each
other's markets, the two have moved slowly and cautiously so they
would not compromise their own domestic industries. Initially,
176 See Changing World to Inter-Korean Trade, KOREA Eco,. DAjLY, Sept. 1,1994,
available at 1994 WL 2100192; Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japan and Asia: Korea-lapin
Tourism Booms as Relations Between Nations Thaw, AsIAN WALL Sr. J, Feb. 24, 2000,
available at 2000 WLWSJA 2935264.
177 See Andrew Cornell, Neighbors Put Old Scores Aside in Quest for Agreement,
AUSrRALIAN FiN. REV., Feb. 10,1999, at 8 ("Japan's growing sense of isolation and
economic vulnerability has added impetus to the ideological shift.").
178 See Courting Japan, supra note 169 ("In spite of the unfortunate history of
Korea and Japan, new economic realities and a need to compete globally are posi-
tioned to make these closest of neighbors, the closest of partners.").
179 Id. ("Their goal: to examine ways of forming a strategic alliance to aid the
recovery of both economies and cooperate closely on trade and investment.").
'SO See id.
181 See id.
182 Id.; see Lee Joon-seung, Korea, Japan Designate 2002 as 'Year for Excange,"
KOREA HERALD, Oct. 25, 1999 (noting that South Korea and Japan pledged in 1999
to cooperate closely within multilateral trade negotiations, including the WTO's
round of talks in November 1999 and that South Korea promised to continue with
its "third-phase" of lowering trade barriers to Japanese cultural items), available at
1999 WL 29056105.
183 See Rowley, supra note 164 (noting that Japan is also considering entering
a similar arrangement with Mexico); cf. Ignacio Gonzalez, Chilean-Korean Partner-
ships Ready to Blossom, Bus. KOREA, Sept. 1, 1999, at 58 (describing South Korea's
possible plans to develop a free trade agreement).
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South Korea attempted to compete internationally by focusing on
niche markets, including cultural exports, to "bolst[er] foreign
shipments."' 84 Japan also made "discrete, niche-oriented" invest-
ments in South Korea.'85 In late 1998, Japanese pop culture was
allowed into South Korea, but only gradually to protect South Ko-
rean industries. 8 6 To further facilitate the mutual opening of
South Korean and Japanese markets, the two countries have cre-
ated a joint consultative body, although South Korea was careful to
point out that South Korean consumers and traders will determine
what products they wish to acquire from Japan.187 The Japanese
similarly qualify their desire for economic cooperation, transfer of
technology, and building alliances with the recognition that South
Korean people should retain a large amount of control over what
and when Japanese products enter the South Korean market.188
Both are willing to concede some of their free trade autonomy in
order to further secure their respective economies, especially their
cultural industries.
5.1.3. Benefits of Regional Agreements
This decision to work together, while at the same time recog-
nizing cultural autonomy and the need to promote culture, has en-
abled many beneficial trade arrangements as well as laid a foun-
dation for advantageous collaboration between the countries in the
future. The two countries have been able to help each other re-
cover from their respective economic crises by supporting the In-
184 Exporters Advised to Aim for Niche Marts; KOTRA Draws up a List of 100
Most Promising Items to Market, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 25, 1998 ("Niche markets ex-
ists [sic] throughout all the world, even at this times [sic] of economic downturn.")
(quoting KOTRA President, Kin Eun-sang), available at 1998 WL 12274851.
185 See Courting Japan, supra note 169.
186 Videos, movies, and comics were let in, but not pop music, animation, and
broadcasting. See Ban on Japanese Films, Videos, and Comics Lifted, KOREA TIMES,
Oct. 20,1998, available at 1998 WL 21403966.
187 See Editorial: Import of Japanese Films, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 21, 1998, available
at 1998 WL 20205493.
[I]t is wholly the decision of Korean consumers or traders to choose what to buy
from the vast array of Japanese cultural market [sic] .... Meanwhile, the local film
industry should consider meeting the challenge by developing its resources and
the quality of its productions with the introduction of Japanese technology, and
possibly Japanese capital, through joint productions.
Id.
188 See Common Interests, Economic Needs Pull Nations Closer, Bus. KOREA, Nov.
1, 1998, at 16.
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ternational Monetary Fund, which then helped cultivate their
economies. 8 9 Also, by focusing on bilateral rather than multilat-
eral trading, Japan and South Korea's strategy became more con-
sistent with, and thus more competitive with, the bilateral ap-
proaches of other countries 90 This cooperative strategy is also a
step towards a more formal South Korean and Japanese free trade
pact, under which South Korean exports would be further able to
replace U.S. and European products in Japan.j91 A free trade
agreement could eventually include China, and trade imbalances
between South Korea, Japan, and China would cancel each other
out.'9
Further, even though Asian countries may be considered by
potential outside investors to be high-risk, South Korea and Japan
could work together to raise capital in the international market so
they can encourage further outside investment93 If they continue
to reduce even non-tariff investment barriers they would not only
set a good free trade, open market precedent 94 for other countries
to follow, 195 but would greatly enhance the "actual trade creation
effect" of a free trade area, thereby producing a surge in foreign di-
rect investment amongst Japan, South Korea, and others.196
Together the two countries could demonstrate to outsiders that
they are able to deal with crises and stabilize their economies-es-
pecially if the problems they face stem from domestic structural
difficulties, and not foreign exchange or liquidity.197 This will in
turn enable them to avoid excessive dependence on the dollar,
1S9 Japan has helped the IMF assist South Korea with liquidity problems. See
Common Interests, supra note 188.
190 See Rowley, supra note 164 (pointing out that twenty-six other countries
benefit from both WTO membership and regional, bilateral agreements).
191 See Free Trade Pact with Japan to Produce Limited Effects, KOREA HERALD,
Dec. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 20206340.
192 See Young-min, supra note 173.
193 See Common Interests, supra note 188, at 2-3.
194 See So-Yon, supra note 174.
195 See Byun Eun-mi, Filmmakers Bridle at U.S. Demands to Scrap Quotas, KOREA
HERALD, Dec. 5,1998, available at 1998 WL 20206544; So-Yon, supra note 174, at 2-3
(noting that as of Jan. 1, 1999, eleven countries still had screen quotas); Young-
min, supra note 173.
196 Young-min, supra note 173, at *2175 (stating that lowering tariff barriers
under a Japan-South Korea free trade agreement would not produce great effects
because these countries already have low tariffs under the WTO, but that reduc-
ing non-tariff barriers would have a large effect).
197 See Common Interests, supra note 188.
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which is desirable because, "[i]n order to avoid the systemic mis-
conduct of all the financial markets in the world, it is desirable that
two or three different kinds of currency play the key roles."198
Similarly, a strong Asian economy would allow the countries to
implement projects such as an "Asian Monetary Fund" 199 to im-
prove Asian countries, and thereby to promote their own values.200
5.1.4. Regionalism as a Move Towards Multilateralism
Although a comprehensive traditional free trade agreement is
not immediately possible between South Korea and Japan,201 sev-
eral components of such an agreement have been considered,202
and continue to be pursued,203 as "fierce competition and over-
capacity problems around the world" as well as financial crisis
make such arrangements more and more crucial.204 Within this
context, Japan, though it is Asia's largest economy and a powerful,
key player in international trade agreements, 205 must be careful to
support international free trade agreements so that Asia's econo-
mies are not isolated.206 By working regionally to improve their
economies, South Korea and Japan will be strong enough to suc-
cessfully assert themselves within a more international free trade
regime. As the world's second and eleventh largest economies, 207
accounting for seventy percent of Asian gross domestic product
193 Id.
199 Barry Wain, Asia-Pacific Body Loses Its Way, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
2000, available at 2000 WLWSJA 23751910.
200 See Yoo Cheong-mo, FKI Foreign Advisors Call for Chaebol Groups to Focus on
Core, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 25, 1999, available at 1999 WL 29056140.
201 See Young-min, supra note 173 (noting that "Korea and Japan are the only
[East Asian] nations not involved in a regional trading arrangement").
202 See Common Interests, supra note 188.
203 See Cornell, supra note 177 (noting that South Korea's president "put for-
ward the concept of an FTA [free trade agreement]"). For some of the most recent
proposals and goals, see Korea, China, Japan Agree on Joint Projects, KOREA HERALD,
Nov. 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27395527; Uniting for Financial Stability, Bus.
KOREA, Dec. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 13140817.
204 Young-min, supra note 173.
205 See Marc Selinger, Japan May Foil Free-Trade Agreement for Asia, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 3,1998, at B7.
206 See id. (suggesting that Japan's refusal to participate in such agreements
could cause other countries to follow suit. "[T]he entire process [could] fall apart,
which could rattle world financial markets and worsen Asia's economic trou-
bles ....").
207 See Cornell, supra note 177, at 1.
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and most regional trading,2 °3 they may be able to form "a major
trading block capable of voicing its concerns against European and
American ones"209 and thus be capable of holding sway with the
European Union and U.S. econoies.21 0
5.2. Applying the Asian Example
Thus, instead of focusing on amending the GATT, an enor-
mously difficult task, countries such as Japan and South Korea that
cannot compete with U.S. exports even in their own domestic mar-
kets should continue to pursue and expand bilateral or regional
trade agreements.2 1' Within these agreements countries will have
more power to preserve and promote their own culture212 vis a vis
each other, and, eventually, relative to other GATT members. The
WTO cannot force compliance, since its legitimacy relies on its per-
ceived credibility 3 among the member parties. If countries build
consensus on measures to promote culture, they will eventually be
able to influence cultural industries' trade issues and hopefully
stabilize their economies and popularize their products. This
shorter-term use of selective measures will ultimately provide lev-
erage 4 to further assert their economic and cultural goals.X5 Once
their products and economies are more established, instead of
203 See Young-min, supra note 173.
209 Id.
210 Cornell, supra note 177.
211 For some of the benefits of foreign countries working together to foster
industries, see Meredith A. Harper, Comment, International Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in the 1990's: Will Trade Barriers and Pirating Practices in te Audio-
visual Industry Continue?, 25 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 153,183 (1994) (noting that through
cooperation both sides may benefit from increased creativity and diversity; they
can "share risks, gain tax breaks, participate in subsidies, avoid quotas, and estab-
lish long-term relationships with foreign partners"); Larrea, supra note 26, at 1147.
212 The mere existence of multilateral trade regimes will not promote or pre-
serve culture, but their existence may enable domestic decisions of what culture is
and how it should be treated. See Browne, supra note 8, at15.
213 See Guy de Jonquieres, Dreams Behind the Scenes, FiN. TIME , Jan. 5,1993, at
11.
214 See Browne, supra note 8, at 14 (suggesting that countries form interna-
tional alliances to shape future trade negotiations) (citing Liss Jeffrey, The Impact of
Globalization and Technological COmange on Culture and National Identity: A Cal for Vi-
sionary Pragmatism, in THE CULTURE/TRADE QUANDARY, supra note 8, at 155-96).
215 See id. at 13 (suggesting that Canada should start to build a consensus con-
sistent with its goals for foreign trade agreements) (citing Ivan Bernier, Cultural
Goods and Services in International Trade Law, in THE CULTuRE/TRADE QUANDARY,
supra note 8, at 108-48).
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endlessly perpetuating or creating economically inefficient situa-
tions, they will be in a position to participate in the global economy
in an non-protectionist, economically advantageous way.216 Their
resulting economic strength will then enable them to reduce pro-
tectionist measures even further so that they can take full advan-
tage of the free trade values inherent in our international trade
systems.
6. CONCLUSION
This Comment describes the importance of preserving and
promoting culture, as well as the difficulties of doing so where an
economy is relatively weak. After establishing the scarcity of op-
portunities to promote culture within the current WTO/GATT
system, it considers and rejects overarching, internationally ori-
ented protectionist measures as both logistically impractical and
undesirably inconsistent with the values underlying international
trade. Less protectionist, intermediate use of regional and bilateral
trade agreements as a means of ultimately achieving efficient mul-
tilateral trade is presented as a more advantageous alternative.
Ideally, countries should use protectionism only to rebuild their
economies in times of crisis. Otherwise they should use bilateral
and regional cooperation to build a powerful economy. As their
regional trading blocs become more powerful, countries will be
able to decide for themselves how to run their cultural industries,
while at the same time promoting those industries abroad. The re-
sulting stability of their products and increase in their profits will
ultimately enable them to become efficient, competitive, non-
protectionist, multilateral traders.
216 See Stanley, supra note 37, at 152 (proposing that Canada use market forces
to its advantage: "(1) forget about cultural exemptions and buy some time with
some carefully worded derogations; (2) recognize the need to increase [her] intel-
lectual capital about the way cultural industries actually work in a global econ-
omy; and [ (3) reformulate our policies in that light"); see also Hwang Jang-jin,
Film Industry's Plea for Screen Quota Turns Emotional, KOREA HERALD, June 18,1999
(questioning whether the quota system would preserve the local film industry:
"Rather than relying on protectionist measures, the industry must make efforts to
elevate the quality of local productions;" easing its forty percent local quota sys-
tem for films would enable South Korea to obtain a bilateral investment treaty
with the United States, as well as U.S. investment in South Korean film) (internal
quotations omitted), available at 1999 WL 17750087.
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